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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE STATUS OF
CUBA.
The status of Cuba since the ratification of the Treaty of
Paris is anomalous, and viewed as a whole it might be called
unique, could this distinction be safely applied to any political
condition.
I venture some observations upon several features of the sit-
uation, in the hope of making a contribution toward a right
understanding of the position of Cuba and the responsibilities
of the United States in its regard.
I.
The first paragraph of Article First of the Treaty of Paris
reads: "Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and
title to Cuba." Here is a parting with territory by Spain, yet
there is no cession, nor even a surrender in the sense of a trans-
fer. At the end of the peace negotiations Spain did what, at
their commencement, she protested could not be done-she
abandoned Cuba, after vainly striving to induce the United
States to accept it from her hands. But the island, though
abandoned, did not become a derelict, being straightway occu-
pied, although not annexed, by the United States.
In these circumstances Cuba remains as foreign to our
domestic system as it was when under the dominion of Spain.
It is not within the purview of the Constitution nor any law of
the United States. It is not within the jurisdiction of Congress,
which is the legislature of the United States and not of any
other country. This limitation of congressional power is pre-
scribed by the rule that the acts of a legislature have no force
in foreign territory, except, of course, as they may be held to
affect citizens abroad. This rule is sometimes stated in terms
recognizing the inability of one state to depreciate the sover-
eignty of another by asserting jurisdiction in the latter's terri-
tory, and were this the whole reason for the rule there might
be difficulty in applying it to Cuba, where there is no state to be
depreciated. But the sufficient reason for the rule is that a leg-
islature is positively without jurisdiction beyond the limits of
the bountry in which it is sovereign.
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The second paragraph of Article First of the Treaty of Paris
reads: "And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to
be occupied by the United States, the United States will so long
as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obliga-
tions that may, under international law, result from the fact of
its occupation, for the protection of life and property."
In considering the nature and effect of this occupation from
the standpoints of the different parties interested in Cuba we
shall gain an approximate idea of the status of the island.
II.
From the standpoint of the United States Cuba is a foreign
country in our occupation and control.
The occupation is not beneficial to us as it would be, presum-
ably, had we annexed the island. In fact, it is decidedly bur-
densome, a vexatious result of a costly war waged for the avowed
purpose of freeing Cuba from Spain in order to turn it over to'
its own people. However this fact may be esteemed in foreign
chancelleries, or in Cuba itself, it entitles the United States to
assert, upon occasion, any right, privilege or immunity that
enures to a disinterested occupant of territory as distinguished
from a sovereign proprietor, and leaves them responsible only
for the discharge of the specific obligations of the Treaty of
Paris, and such duties, sufficiently onerous, as may be attached
'by international law to an-occupation of this peculiar kind.
Our control over Cuba savors of the protectoral relation in
important respects, yet it is not a protectorate, because, apart
from uncivilized regions, the subject of this relation is a state
of more or less substantial powers.
There is no state of Cuba, and we shall only add to the
embarrassments of a sufficiently difficult problem by tolerating
such fictions as an embryo state, or even an effective sovereignty
in the Cuban people. It is true that there are in operation in
the island municipal and provincial systems of government and
a complete judicial system, all officered by Cubans, but these
agencies do not emanate from a local sovereignty. They exist
by the ordination or permission of the United States. To be
short, whatever sovereignty there is in Cuba to-day is vested
in the representatives of the United States who administer the-
Government of Cuba.
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The Government of Cuba is, essentially, the President of the
United States, the island being ruled by -his subordinates
who execute his orders, or their own, which he adopts if he
does not revoke. It cannot be said that this government is or-
ganically independent of the United States, for the President
enjoys his powers by virtue of his office, and in no respect
either within or without the United States is that office sepa-
rable from the Federal Government of which it is a co-ordinate
branch. The Government of Cuba is rooted in Washington, not
in Havana. It is an offshoot of the Executive Department of
the United States projected into and holding its place in a for-
eign territory with the assent of Congress. Hence, although
the island of Cuba is not within the jurisdiction of Congress,
the Government of Cuba is subject to every power which the
federal legislature is authorized to exert in regard to the Execu-
tive Department.
Whether Congress is competent to order this government to
pass specific laws for the island, and thus legislate effectively
for it through the medium of the Executive Department with-
out bringing it technically within congressional jurisdiction, I
do not discuss. The impropriety of this action should be a suf-
ficent reason for avoiding it.
Our control over Cuba may be called "military" in view of
its origin, the agencies by which it is chiefly managed, and its
freedom from the restraints of municipal law, yet it is not prop-
erly identified with a military occupation of foreign territory
contemplated by the laws of war. Our control should be, as it
is, exerted less rigorously than a "military occupation," and in
thus differentiating it I rely upon the persuasive ethics ofinter-
national law which discourage the application of belligerent
right to a peaceful country. And Cuba is at peace, though pru-
dence may forbid at present the diminution of our forces, and
if need be the government may be called upon to display full
military powers in the face of insurrection. I say "insurrec-
tion" advisedly, because at the moment our government was
established in Cuba it rightfully demanded the obedience of
the people.
While our control is less onerous than an ordinary military
occupation, its activities are more varied and its responsibilities
are heavier.
The conqueror's strict duty to the inhabitants of the terri-
tory is performed when he affords them such liberty of action
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and protection as the exigencies of honorable warfare permit.
Our duty in Cuba is to govern a friendly country. And this
brings us to the grave question as to the powers of our govern-
ment over the lives and fortunes of the people.
The fourth clause of the Joint Resolution of Congress, April
20, 1898, reads: "The United States hereby disclaims any dis-
position or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or
control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and
asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the
government and control of the island to its people," and this
was incorporated in the ultimatum delivered to Spain. "Paci-
fication" is the master-word of the first part of the clause, and
did this express a self-imposed law, we have broken it, for after
stretching the word to the uttermost many of our acts in Cuba
are hopelessly beyond its meaning. For example, the pacifica-
tion of Cuba is not promoted by orders regulating the sponge
fishery,' and prescribing that civil marriages only, shall be
legally valid.' The truth is "pacification" did not prefigure the
great responsibilities and the sequent powers of. the United
States in taking charge of Cuba, and so far from breaking faith
by assuming temporarily complete control they have per-
formed a duty necessitated by the absence of a local govern-
ment.
The Government of Cuba is not bound by any law of the
United States in its dealings with the people, nor by any law of
the old regime which it may choose to alter or repeal. Yet,
although it is not restrained by a municipal constitution of
which the governed may take advantage, I should hesitate
to define this government as despotic in theory, not merely for
sentimental reasons, but rather because it is required by prin-
ciple as well as by treaty to respect the dictates of international
law.
The government, however defined, is charged with the duty.
of administering Cuba and abating the grosser evils of the
Spanish r6gime. And doubtless there is a field for remedial
action beyond these imperative duties. But zeal for reform, a
preference for the American way, which we understand over
the Spanish way which we do not understand, should not lead
to disturbances of fundamental law and inveterate custom un-
becoming the office of a provisional ruler.
General Brooke's Civil Report I, iog.
'Id. 44.
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Our occupation is terminable at our discretion; and within
our power is the method of eiiding it, though the brutal way of
abandonment is practically out of the question.
The United States may end the present occupation by chang-
ing its character to sovereign proprietorship-by annexing the
island. This can be accomplished only by Congress; the treaty
making body, which usually enlarges the United States, being
without jurisdiction in this case because there is no other gov-
ernment competent to make a cession.
Annexation by formal act would be the orderly course, but
might not the same result be reached by Congress legislating
for the island? We are so accustomed to enlarge our dominion
by formal consent of the titular sovereign of the desired terri-
tory that we are apt to lose sight of the truth that land may be
annexed as well by the actual assumption of jurisdiction by the
President and Congress as by a treaty of cession. Said the
Supreme Court, "Who is the sovereign, de jure or defacto, of a
territory is not a judicial, but a political question, the deter-
mination of which by the legislative and executive departments
of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all
other officers, citizens and subjects of that government. This
principle has always been upheld by this court, and has been
affirmed under a great variety of circumstances."' And Chief
Justice Marshall said: "If those departments which are in-
trusted with the foreign intercourse of the nation, which assert
and maintain its interests against foreign powers, have un-
equivocally asserted its rights of dominion over a country of
which it is in possession, and which it claims under a treaty; if
the legislature has acted on the construction thus asserted, it is
not in its own courts that this construction is to be denied. A
question like this respecting the boundaries of nations, is, as
has been truly said, more a political than a legal question, and
in its discussion, the courts of every country must respect the
pronounced will of the legislature." '
The principle of Marshall's opinion covers a broader field.
than the disputed boundaries of land ceded by treaty, which
was the case in Foster v. Neilson. If the army of the United
States seizes foreign land; if a treaty of peace does not mention
hostile territory then occupied by our forces, thereby recogniz.
'Jones v. U. S., 131 U. S. 202, 212.
4 Foster v. Neilson, 2 Peters 253, 309, cited in U. S. v. Lynde, ii Wallace
632, 638.
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ing our possession by the operation of the principle of uti piossi-
detis; if American officers take possession of unoccupied land in
the name of the Republic, Congress, by legislating for these
territories, may effect their incorporation in the United States.
Now Congress is at present without jurisdiction in Cuba, but
the island is in possession of our forces. If, then, Congress
shall choose to make laws for Cuba, the legislative and execu-
tive departments of our government will have asserted the per-
fect sovereignty of the United States, and the courts will follow
their lead, provided the assertion be unequivocal.
Of course our courts would not recognize a statute of doubt-
ful range as extending to Cuba. They would endeavor to con-
strue a statute evidently intended to-be operative in the island
as an exertion of exterritorial power over our citizens abroad,
and not a law of the place. And, though this suggests a most
delicate question, it is possible that a statute plainly directed
to Cuba might be so trivial in itself or so markedly at variance
with the pronounced attitude of Congress that the court would
properly treat it as ultra vires rather than infer the tremendous
consequence of an enlargement of the United States from such
doubtful evidence of intention.
The method by which the United States are pledged to end
their occupation of Cuba is to recognize a Cuban state. It is
predicted that the pledge will be broken, or falsely kept by
setting up a toy state that will cede the island to us in due form.
Of these political forecasts I have only to say, at present, that I
have yet to see the reason why the -pledge should not be kept,
and refuse to believe that the United States will play an hypo-
critical trick to gain an end which, if improper, should not be pur-
sued, and, if proper, should be gained by the straightforward
method of annexation by act of Congress.
III.
From the Cuban standpoint the island is in a singular
position. Severed from Spain; not joined to the United States;
not the territory of a Cuban state; Cuba is in some sense
merely a region administered by a foreign master.
Yet although the island is not the seat of a state it possesses
a marked characteristic of an organized society-a body of law:
Spanish in origin, yet retaining its vitality after the withdrawal.
of Spain; alterable by the government we have established, yet
never becoming United States law, this body is the law of the
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place, and the fact of its existence makes Cuba to some extent a
political entity. To this law of the place, both civil and criminal,
all persons in Cuba are subject, including all foreigners except-
ing our citizens whose connection with the army may subject
them to the military laws of the United States.
What is the status of the people of Cuba, including in this
class the Peninsular subjects of Spain who have not elected to
retain Spanish citizenship in conformity with the provision of
the Treaty of Paris?
On April 20, x898, Congress resolved "that the people of Cuba
are, and of right ought to be, free and independent." In point
of law, this resolution had no more effect in Cuba than a resolu-
tion "that the Sultan of Morocco has and ought to have but
one wife" would have in his palace. In point of fact, the reso-
lution, so far as it dealt with the existing order of things, did
not express a truth at the date of its passage-indeed, in the
same breath Congress practically resolved to go war with Spain
because the Cubans were not free and independent. Nor are
they free and independent to-day.
The Cubans are no longer subjects of Spain. Divested of
Spanish nationality, by their own consent in the case of Penin-
sulars who have cast their lot with Cuba, by the act of Spain in
the case of Cuban-born subjects who were not given a right of
election, they can be reintegrated only by complying with the
provisions of Spanish law. The situation of men of Cuban
birth who prefer Spanish citizenship is indeed a hard one, yet
they cannot question the legality of the rupture of the old
allegiance, for with the right of a sovereign to cede territory is
coupled the right to disavow further responsibility for its inhab-
itants.
The Cubans are not, of course, citizens of the United States,
nor are they technically our subjects, though if they can be said
to owe allegiance to any political head it is to the government
we have set over them. They have been called "citizens of Cuba,"
and so long as we understand their citizenship to be of that sin-
gular kind that does not involve membership in the political
society we call a state, we may accept this classification, which
seems to be approved by the Treaty of Paris. The Ninth Arti-
cle declares that if the Peninsular subjects of Spain residing in
ceded or relinquished territories shall not within a certain time
declare an intention to retain their allegiance, "they shall be
held to have renounced it, and to have adopted the nationality
of the territory in which they may reside." "Nationality" is
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evidently used in a political sense, and in order to give effect to
this meaning in Porto Rico and the Philippines we must assume
that the persons mentioned adopt the nationality of the United
States, because as the United States have annexed these islands
it would be as absurd to speak of Porto Rican or Philippine
nationality as of Alaskan or New Mexican nationality. But as
the United States have not annexed Cuba we can give effect to
the provision in its regard only by accepting the theory of a
Cuban nationality for what it is worth.
A familiar principle of public law is that a radical change of
government, however it may alter the public order of things,
shall, of itself, affect private relations and rights as little as
possible.
The application of this principle to the domestic affairs of
Cuba does not call for special consideration. It is sufficient to
observe that rights vested under the old laws are not to be
abrogated; that the old laws themselves endure unless they are
altered by the provisional government; and that the" people
must receive from this government protection to person and
property. Beyond these domestic affairs there are interests
growing out of the intercourse between Cuba and the world at
large, and to these the principle should be applied wherever
practicable.
Cuba is still within the domain of private international law,
and I assume that the courts of foreign nations, including, of
course, our own, will generally continue to apply their rules in
international controversies, involving contracts, wills, marriages
and the like, as though the island had not undergone a political
change.
Whether a foreigner may sue a person in the courts of the
latter's country depends upon the local law, and it will be
assumed that foreign courts heretofore open to Cuban subjects
of Spain will not be closed to Cuban proteg6s of the United
States. It is especially important that Cubans shall not lose
any privileges in American courts because the United States
have placed them in an anomalous position, and where proof of
alienage is sufficient to confer jurisdiction there will be no
question as to the propriety of entertaining their suits, for
unquestionably they are aliens. Because the right to sue is
accorded "to citizens or subjects of a foreign state," by the
Constitution of the United States, an effort has been made to
bar Cubans from the fedetal courts, but Judge Lacombe has'
decided in their favor, saying of the defendant's contention:
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"There is certainly nothing in all this which lends any color
to the proposition that the plaintiff is npt a foreign citizen.
Even the brief memorandum of opinion in Stuart v. City.of
Easton (156 U. S. 46), gives no support to demurrant's conten-
tion. One may be puzzled to determine upon what theory it
was held in that case that a "citizen of London, England," is
not a "foreign citizen;" but assuming, as suggested, that it is
because London is not a free and independent community, but
owes allegiance to the British Crown, the decision has no appli-
cation to the case at bar, since the political branch of this gov-
ernment has found as a political fact that the people of the
island of Cuba "are free and independent."' May not Judge
Lacombe's conclusion be upheld without lending judicial sanc-
tion to the fiction of Cuban independence? Even if we attribute
to Cubans a sort of citizenship they are neither citizens nor sub-
jects of a "foreign state," for there is no ' state' -of Cuba, and
the government we have established is not "foreign." As the let-
ter of the Constitution must be departed from to some extent to
effectuate its meaning, why should not the provision be inter-
preted, as a whole, in the broad spirit which animates it, and
the courts be declared open to persons who show that they are
not citizens of the United States ?
Besides international controversies determinable in the
courts, there are private interests recognized by the law and
custom of nations as being the proper subjects of. diplomatic
assistance or negotiation, and for which individuals may request
the good offices of their government. Regarding the common
protection and privileges to which persons in foreign countries
are entitled by international law, the diplomatic and consular
offices of the United States may be exerted in behalf of Cubans
as nearly to the extent of their exertion for our own citizens as
the rules of foreign governments and our own permit.
Generally speaking, our concern for Cubans abroad cannot
be properly questioned by a foreign government, for these rea-
sons: Because the relation between a state and a person for
whom it claims protection is no concern of a foreign state
unless it claims him as its own citizen, and we shall not meet
this embarrassment because Spain has completely denational-
ized her Cuban subjects: Because as foreign governments are
entitled, as we shall see, to view the United States as the pro-
" Betancourt v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, N. Y. Law Jour-
nal, 'May iS, 0goo.
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tector of the interests of their subjects in the island, they will
not disavow the reciprocal duty of safeguarding Cuban interests
in their own dominions.
The fact that Cubans cannot receive United States passports,
*hich are issuable to citizens only, is not especially detri-
mental. The State Department has approved the issuance of
the following consular certificate to an American Indian: "The
bearer of this document is a North American Indian whose
name is Hampa. This Indian is a ward of the United States,
and is entitled to the protection of its consular and other
officials. He is not, however, entitled to a passport, as he is
not a citizen of tho United States. This consulate has the
honor to request the Russian authorities to grant Hampa all
necessary protection during his stay in Russia, and grant him
permission to depart when he requires it."' The State Depart-
ment may issue suitable certificates to Cubans-probably it has
already done so-and these will be honored abroad .as our
Indian certificate seems to have been, and as the passports
issued by Great Britain and France to persons not their
citizens, but within their protection, are honored.
Whatever rights under Spanish treaties Cubans may have
enjoyed abroad as Spanish subjects have been lost by the
severance of Cuba from Spain. Whatever rights may be
secured to them by the treaty of Paris are enforceable by the
United States, at least during the term of their control.
Whether the United States shall be disposed to request and be
-able to secure for Cubans the benefit of treaty rights in foreign
lands enjoyed by their own citizens depends upon the nature
of the particular right in question. There is no doubt that the
benefit of our consular jurisdiction in non-Christian countries
.should be claimed for Cubans. On the other hand, it would be
absurd for the United States to demand for them the fishing
rights on the Northeast coast secured to the people or citizens
of the United States by treaty with Great Britain.
IV.
The distinction between Cuba and the United States which
we maintain as a matter of domestic law and polity is not alto-
gether effective from the standpoint'of foreign nations.
When a region is occupied by a foreign state, other states
are not necessarily affected by the motive of the occupation, so
far as their current intercourse is concerned, and, in their
reasonable demand for a visible and responsible head to a
6 Hunt's The American Passport, p 147
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country with which they deal, are entitled to treat the occu-
pant as the. sovereign for certain purposes. And it is the in-
terest as well as the duty of the occupant to accept the proper
responsibilities of the position, because if these be disavowed
the country may be left without a government, and in this
event a foreign state being unable to protect its lawful in-
terests by negotiation, may at once employ adequate force.
From the standpoint of foreign nations Cuba is in some
sense part of the United States, and the United States accept
this conclusion of international law.
According to the first article of the Treaty of Paris already
cited, "the United States will, so long as such occupation shall
"last, assume and discharge the obligations that may, under
" international law, result from the fact of its occupation, for
" the protection of life and property." While this clause is part
of a treaty with Spain, and does not import an agreement with
any other nation, it is really but the'acknowledgment of an in-
dependent obligation to all nations. " And it may prove to be
an inadequate acknowledgment, for if, perchance, there be any
international duty not included in "the protection of life and
property," the United States cannot honorably avoid the conse-
quences of a breach of it by referring to the treaty as the
measure of their responsibility.
In considering our duties to foreign nations in regard to
-Cuba we must first differentiate Spain from the generality in
regard to the special agreements made with her in the Treaty
of Paris. Apart from the law of the Treaty of Paris, by which
Spain is particularly bound and benefited, she stands with the
other nations in respect of international rights and obligations.
The foreign responsibilities cast upon an occupant in the
case of occupation of hostile territory during war, when inevi-
table disorder may excuse unavoidable defaults, and when the
ousted sovereign has still a legal title to the country, and may
regain possession by reconquest or treaty, are broader and
heavier in Cuba, where order reigns if not contentment, and
whence the old sovereign has departed leaving the representa-
tives of the United States in full control.
Without attempting to forecast the possible reclamations
that may be made against the United States on Cuban account,
it-should be understood by the Cubans that if the United States
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become liable for a pecuniary indemnity they will place the
real burden where it belongs. If the injury be caused by the un-
lawful act or omission of United States citizens, the indemnity
should be charged upon the Federal Treasury. On the other
hand an indemnity due on account of the acts of Cubans should
be charged to Cuba, and paid either out of insular revenues, or
by Cuban obligations which the United States should guarantee
to the creditor and enforce against the debtor.
CARMAN F. RANDOLPH.
